Establishing severe acute respiratory infection (SARI) surveillance in a sentinel hospital, Ireland, 2021 to 2022.

BackgroundIn 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) accelerated development of European-level severe acute respiratory infection (SARI) surveillance.AimWe aimed to establish SARI surveillance in one Irish hospital as part of a European network E-SARI-NET.MethodsWe used routine emergency department records to identify cases in one adult acute hospital. The SARI case definition was adapted from the ECDC clinical criteria for a possible COVID-19 case. Clinical data were collected using an online questionnaire. Cases were tested for SARS-CoV-2, influenza and respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), including whole genome sequencing (WGS) on SARS-CoV-2 RNA-positive samples and viral characterisation/sequencing on influenza RNA-positive samples. Descriptive analysis was conducted for SARI cases hospitalised between July 2021 and April 2022.ResultsOverall, we identified 437 SARI cases, the incidence ranged from two to 28 cases per week (0.7-9.2/100,000 hospital catchment population). Of 431 cases tested for SARS-CoV-2 RNA, 226 (52%) were positive. Of 349 (80%) cases tested for influenza and RSV RNA, 15 (4.3%) were positive for influenza and eight (2.3%) for RSV. Using WGS, we identified Delta- and Omicron-dominant periods. The resource-intensive nature of manual clinical data collection, specimen management and laboratory supply shortages for influenza and RSV testing were challenging.ConclusionWe successfully established SARI surveillance as part of E-SARI-NET. Expansion to additional sentinel sites is planned following formal evaluation of the existing system. SARI surveillance requires multidisciplinary collaboration, automated data collection where possible, and dedicated personnel resources, including for specimen management.

Multisystem inflammatory syndrome in the context of paediatric COVID-19 infection in the Republic of Ireland April 2020 to April 2021.

AIM: Our aim was to describe the epidemiology of multisystem inflammatory syndrome in children (MIS-C) in the Republic of Ireland, in the context of all cases of COVID-19 in children, during the first year of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. METHODS: Cases of MIS-C were identified by prospective surveillance in Irish hospitals from April 2020 to April 2021. Paediatric COVID-19 cases and outbreaks in schools or childcare facilities were notified to and routinely investigated by Public Health. Univariate and bivariate analyses were carried out in Excel, Stata and JMP statistical package. RESULTS: Fifty-four MIS-C cases (median age 7.58 years; males 57%) were identified over the study period. MIS-C incidence was higher in certain ethnicities ('black' 21.3/100,000 [95% CI 4.3-38.4]; and 'Irish Traveller' 14.7/100,000 [95% CI -5.7-35.1]) than those of 'white' ethnicity (3.4 /100,000). MIS-C cases occurred in three temporal clusters, which followed three distinct waves of community COVID-19 infection, irrespective of school closures. Formal contact tracing identified an epidemiological link with a COVID-19-infected family member in the majority of MIS-C cases (77%). In contrast, investigation of COVID-19 school outbreaks demonstrated no epidemiological link with MIS-C cases during the study period. CONCLUSION: Efforts at controlling SARS-CoV-2 transmission in the community may be a more effective means to reduce MIS-C incidence than school closures. Establishing a mandatory reporting structure for MIS-C will help delineate the role of risk factors such as ethnicity and obesity and the effect of vaccination on MIS-C incidence.

A large national outbreak of COVID-19 linked to air travel, Ireland, summer 2020.

An outbreak of 59 cases of coronavirus disease (COVID-19) originated with 13 cases linked by a 7 h, 17% occupancy flight into Ireland, summer 2020. The flight-associated attack rate was 9.8-17.8%. Spread to 46 non-flight cases occurred country-wide. Asymptomatic/pre-symptomatic transmission in-flight from a point source is implicated by 99% homology across the virus genome in five cases travelling from three different continents. Restriction of movement on arrival and robust contact tracing can limit propagation post-flight.